THE SANCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
If lawyers have been discussing this question quite continuously for several centuries the fact that they have reached no solution or agreement thereon is both interesting and significant; interesting because a great unsolved problem must ever lure acute
minds to renewed efforts, and significant because we ask ourselves
why so much thought has seemed to result in so little certainty.
The reason for this, I am forced to conclude, is because the question
itself is not a legal question at all. Such a suggestion might savor
of temerity were it made by a mere layman; but for one of the profession it may be permissible at times to suggest our own limitations.
The question of whether international law is law, and what
constitutes law, belongs in fact to the domain of psychology. As
well ask the ord nary mathematician to expound the value, relative
or absolute, of the laws of mind or of nature, or the ordinary physician to reply to the question: "What is life?" The fact that the
mathematician deals with axioms and postulates and the physiclan with the living organism, does not qualify them to dogmatize
regarding the underlying philosophy of either.
It thus requires a broader view than that which the mere
lawyer qua lawyer usually possesses to answer the question: "What
is international law?" Some rules of more or less general observance have long existed, but the exact definition and delimitation
of these rules and how far they may be law, in the ordinarily.accepted sense of that word, it is difficult to say. International law
was supposed, by many thinkers a generation ago, to have no
sanction because of the prevailing Austinian theory regarding the
nature of municipal law. Lawyers thought an Act of Parliament
constituted exclusive material from which to deduce a definition
of law, forgetting that only a small part of the law was in the form
of statute and that English law antedated not only Parliament,
but the kingship.
The fact seems to be that there is little real difference between
national and international law as to its sanction. Municipal law
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may be and frequently is violated and so is the law of nations, but
in either event, there is some risk in so doing. If the nations do
not ultimately enforce some of the law to which they have assented,
this lack of enforcement is often true of statute and municipal law
generally.
International law is that body of rules which is so far assented
to and so far enforced that it deserves the name of law; it is something which connotes a certain regularity of human conduct, induced not by necessary sequences of nature, but by human volition. It is not necessary, tci make international law, that all
members of the family of nations shall have assented thereto, but
the dominant nations at least should do so.
The utmost possible field of arbitration is necessarily coterminous with that of law. Where there is no law, there may be&
settlement of an international dispute, but it will be reached through
diplomatic channels and not through judicial tribunals. The
cause of arbitration may be injured rather than aided by an unwillingness or inability to understand this necessary limitation of
its scope. There can be no arbitration where there is either no
law or no adequate law to meet the case. Parties cannot arbitrate
matters which cannot be stated in terms of law. The effort toextend the field of arbitration must go hand in hand with the endeavor to widen the scope of international law as it now stands,
as well as to better existing law by placing it on the basis of a
broader morality. The inability of pacificists generally Lo recognize
this situation retards the cause of peace.
The use of force in the Itwentieth century cannot be justified
at the bar of public opinion unless it can truthfully predicate a
moral basis. Our most noted naval historian and e; inent publicist, Admiral Mahan, says:
"Hence, the recognition that, if force 'is necessary, force
must be used for the benefit of the community, of the commonwealth of the world. This fundamental proposition is not impaired by the fact that force is best exercised through law,'
wrhen adeguate law exists, except as the expression of right law
is an incubus. Hence, much of the present magnification of
law is mere fetich."
This doctrine may well be termed the trusteeship of force. In
illustration of his proposition the distinguished .kdniral cites the
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Monroe Doctrine. The purpose of the Holy Alliance to restore
Spanish domination in South America, was not, as he argues, in
contravention of law as it was then, or even now is. Legally, the
right to coerce South American states might not, as a legal proposition, have been questioned by the United States, but the law
of self-preservation and of the right to develop our own civilization untrammelled by dangers incident to the conflict of the old
world, justified the United States in refusing to allow other nations
the exercise of the generally admitted right toacquire territory whenever that acquisition was on the Arherican continent.
I cannot quite assent to the correctness of the Admiral's
analysis of the situation. This is scarcely a case of imperfection or
inadequacy in the law, but rather an instance in which a general
rule becomes inapplicable to certain particular conditions, because
in conflict with a paramount national policy.
Admiral Mahan says:
"The relations of interdependent states are not susceptible
of full establishment, nor of all necessary adjustment from
time to time, upon a basis of law."
As long as special national policies prevent the exercise of
their full legal rights on the part of other nations in certain respects,
the nation professing such non-legally recognized policies is forced
to maintain them against those who seek to carry out their legal
rights to the full. This necessitates armament. Such a cause of
possible war is not legally avertable. To minimize that danger,
we must work for acquiescence in such policy, when just, by the
other nations, and this can be done only through diplomatic channels and the education of public opinion. Where controversies of
this character arise, as in the case of the Guiana-Venezuela boundary,
we can only rely upon a peace sentiment so strong that diplomacy
may have time to adjust questions which cannot be submitted to
judicial determination until the conflict between law and national
policy is settled.
The causes of modern war are often said to be commercial.
This is true in a superficial sense only. Commercial friction and
commercial ambition may indeed be the proximate causes, but
they are not the real and ultimate causes. There can be no war
today where the temper and sentiment of the people is not such that
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they can be inflamed into a general passion. The day for the hiring
of Hessians to shoot strangers with iihom they have no possible
cause of quarrel, at the mere behest of a ruler, has long gone by.
The governments of today cannot make war in defiance of
public opinion, nor is there the slightest chance of their taking
so great a responsibility. The danger is that they will be overridden and that their diplonlatic efforts will come to naught because of the kindling of patriotic enthusiasm which over-rides the
desires of the government. Jingoism usually proceeds from below,
up, not from above, down.
Yet the fact that war betwecn two nations is quite possible,
does not make it inevitable. For instance, nothing seems more improbable than a war between Great Britain and the United States.
No serious conflicting interests are involved. Both nations are
satisfied with'the status quo in regard to territory on this continent.
But we must reAdmiral Mahan considers it unthinkable.
member, as a warning and a safeguard, the strong antipathies of
the past which have sunk largely into the subconsciousness of
both peoples. The traditions of the conflicts of the Revolution, of
the War of 1812, of the mutual animosities stirred up during our
Civil War and as a consequence of the Alabama affair still subsist,
though at present dormant and dwindling.
It does not require the modern psychologist or M. Le Bon's
analysis of the spirit of the crowd to show us how readily such
latent states of feeling may in a moment of excitement be roused
into conscious action and prove irresistible forces, just as we have
seen religious passions, long slumbering, suddenly kindled into
fury by apparently small incidents. Against such mass passions,
reason has slim chance indeed.
The inevitable propriety of submitting to arbitration questions growing out of the interpretation of existing treaties seems
obvious, yet it is some times questioned. As a treaty necessarily
concerns both parties, its interpretation can by no possibility of
law or logic be a mere domestic question.
In 1743 Spain and Great Britain embarked upon a disastrous
war all over the alleged loss by a seaman named Jenkins of his ear.
As Green pithily puts it:
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"The ill humor of the trading classes rose to madness in
1738, when a merchant captain named Jenkins told at the Bar
of the House of Commons the tale of his torture by the Spaniards,
and produced an ear which he said they had cut off with taunts
at the English king. It was in vain that Walpole strove to do
justice to both parties, and that he battled stubbornly against
the cry for an unjust and impolitic war. But his efforts were
in vain. His negotiations were foiled by the frenzy of one
country and the pride of another."
Thus the war for Jenkins' ear was entered upon, despite the desires of the Government and England suffered reverses and tremendous loss in lives and money, all'to no purpose. For even had Jenkins'
story been true, it would hardly have justified a disastrous conflict
between great nations, nor would it have restored to him the lost
feature. But it is even probable that his tale was untrue, or
greatly exaggerated. As Lecky tells the story (History of the
18th Century, Vol. x, p. 416):
"The truth of the story is extremely doubtful, but the end
that was aimed at was attained. The indignation of the people,
fanned as it was by the press, and by the untiring efforts of all
sections of the Opposition, became uncontrollable."
Here indeed was a war demanded by no national policy, induced by no particular oppression, for authoritative historians tell
us that there was no serious violation of international law or right
on the part of Spain toward England.
Such a conflict is an evidence of the fact that war may often
be an avertable accident. Had there been a tribunal to which
England might have adressed her plea on behalf of her unfortunate
seaman, redress might easily have been found and the danger of
public outburst averted.
The danger of war today comes from popular feeling. Give
diplomacy time and opportunity and the danger of war will be
minimized. No modern civilized people will allow themselves to
be drawn into a war which they consider unjust. Hence, the assurance in advance that there is law and a forum to which the aggrieved may appeal side-tracks exhibitions of popular feeling at
the outburst. It may not always avert war, just as the decision of
the Supreme Court in the Dred Scot case could not avert our Civil
War, but it will materially lessen'its probability.
Yet, our War of x812, the Mexican War, the late Spanish.
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American War, should have been so averted. The popular excitement created by the destruction of the Maine, made it almost
impossible for diplomacy to avoid the conflict. Popular feeling
forced the hands of statesmen as it had done before, yet immediate submission of the question of Spain's responsibility to a rerecognized international tribunal might well have averted this
popular outburst.
The history of arbitration is a gratifying story. Many dis-

putes have been settled, much law has-been evolved, but more
even has been done than that; in many cases an escape has been
found from the coercive forces of popular sentiment, prejudice and
inherited animosity, which, if left unappeased, might easily have
led to conflict.
Commercial jealousies certainly have their part in bringing
about war, but no-peoples consciously go to war for commercial
gain. The causes are far deeper. If the sparks of popular passion,
kindled by disputes over commercial matters, can be smothered at
once, or never allowed to burst into flame, then war may often be
averted and settlement reached through arbitration where international law is adequate, and in those comparatively rare instances
where there is no law, through diplomatic dealings. But justice
denied or delayed is the most fruitful source of human strife, both
between individuals and among nations. The development of
adequate law and the perfection of the mechanism of arbitration
will accomplish far more substantial results than any mere expressions of laudable sentiments.
Frederic R. Coudert
New York, December, 191z2.

